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Abstract—Data deduplication is able to effectively identify and
eliminate redundant data and only maintain a single copy of files
and chunks. Hence, it is widely used in cloud storage systems
to save storage space and network bandwidth. However, the
occurrence of deduplication can be easily identified by monitoring
and analyzing network traffic, which leads to the risk of user
privacy leakage. The attacker can carry out a very dangerous
side channel attack, i.e., learn-the-remaining-information (LRI)
attack, to reveal users’ privacy information by exploiting the
side channel of network traffic in deduplication. Existing work
addresses the LRI attack at the cost of the high bandwidth
efficiency of deduplication. In order to address this problem,
we propose a simple yet effective scheme, called randomized
redundant chunk scheme (RRCS), to significantly mitigate the
risk of the LRI attack while maintaining the high bandwidth
efficiency of deduplication. The basic idea behind RRCS is to add
randomized redundant chunks to mix up the real deduplication
states of files used for the LRI attack, which effectively obfuscates
the view of the attacker, who attempts to exploit the side channel
of network traffic for the LRI attack. Our security analysis shows
that RRCS could significantly mitigate the risk of the LRI attack.
We implement the RRCS prototype and evaluate it by using three
large-scale real-world datasets. Experimental results demonstrate
the efficiency and efficacy of RRCS.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the International Data Corporation (IDC)
report, the amount of worldwide digital data created and
replicated reaches 4.4 Zettabytes in 2013, while exceeding
44 Zettabytes in 2020 [1]. IDC analysis also shows that
nearly 75% data has a copy [2], which indicates a large
amount of data redundancy existing in our digital world.
Moreover, Microsoft Research collects the file data from 857
desktop computers with the size of 162TB, and finds that there
exist nearly 40% duplicate data in personal data and nearly
68% duplicate data in the shared data among users [3]. The
data redundancy causes large and inefficient consumptions of
storage capacity and network bandwidth in distributed file and
storage systems.
In order to save network bandwidth and storage space, data
deduplication [4]–[6] identifies data redundancy and maintains
a single copy of files or chunks, which has been widely
used in various fields, such as, cloud storage services [7]–
[9], Redundancy Elimination (RE) in networks [10], [11]. In
general, deduplication may occur either at the source (client)
or the target (server). In the source-based deduplication, their
fingerprints are first uploaded to the server before uploading
files (or chunks). If the fingerprints exist in the index of
the server, the corresponding files will not be uploaded. On
the other hand, in the target-based deduplication, the files
are directly uploaded to the server, and then deduplicated.
The former can obtain both bandwidth and storage savings,
while the latter only saves storage space. Moreover, duplicates
can be detected among the files owned by a single user or
cross users. Single-user deduplication only identifies redundant
data in a single user. Based on the single-user deduplication,
further using the cross-user deduplication can identify more
redundant data among users, thus obtaining significant space
savings [3], which has been widely used in current cloud
storage systems [12], [13].
Although the cross-user source-based deduplication sig-
nificantly improves storage and bandwidth utilizations, the
occurrence of deduplication can be easily identified by mon-
itoring and analyzing network traffic, which leads to the
risk of user privacy leakage. The attacker can carry out a
much dangerous side channel attack, i.e., learn-the-remaining-
information (LRI) attack, to obtain user privacy by exploiting
the side channel of network traffic in deduplication, which is
detailed in Section II-A. Harnik et al. [14] perform tests and
find that the LRI attack can occur in the popular cloud storage
services such as Dropbox [7] and Mozy [8]. Unfortunately, the
LRI attack in deduplication is difficult to be addressed due to
the following challenges.
The Limitations Using CE or MLE. To protect data
confidentiality in deduplication, convergent encryption (CE) is
used to encrypt data [15]. CE proposed by Douceur et al. [16]
uses the hash of files to encrypt the files so that the repeated
files always generate identical ciphertexts. Thus deduplication
can be done over the encrypted data. Bellare et al. [17]
formalize CE and its variants as a cryptographic primitive,
called message-locked encryption (MLE). However, even if
data are encrypted by CE/MLE in cryptography deduplication
systems, there still exists the risk of the LRI attack. Because
the attacker could always carry out the LRI attack based
on the side channel of network traffic to perceive whether
deduplication occurs without probing the data themselves.
Deduplication Inefficiency. There are two baseline solu-
tions to defend against the LRI attack. The first solution is
to use encryption to avoid cross-user deduplication. Before
uploading files to the cloud server, a client encrypts the files
using the users’ personal keys, and the duplicate files cross
users will produce different ciphertexts via encryption with
different keys. This solution prevents the cross-user dedupli-
cation in the server, but substantially increases bandwidth and
storage overheads. The second solution is to perform target-
based deduplication. Files are directly uploaded to the server
and then deduplicated. This solution has no bandwidth saving
and only reduces the storage overhead compared with source-
based deduplication. Both the two solutions substantially de-
crease the deduplication efficiency. Hence, it is nontrivial to
defend against the LRI attack while ensuring the deduplication
efficiency.
Several schemes have been proposed to defend against the
LRI attack. Harnik et al. [14] propose the randomized thresh-
old solution (RTS). However, RTS causes huge bandwidth
overhead due to uploading redundant data, and has the risk
of leaking privacy with a certain probability. Heen et al. [18]
propose a gateway-based deduplication model that has to use a
gateway (i.e., home router) as the third entity in deduplication
systems to improve the resistance to the LRI attack. However,
the solution needs an extra gateway provided by the Network
Service Provider [18], which is not always possible in practical
settings.
To address the challenges, this paper proposes a bandwidth-
efficient scheme, i.e., RRCS, for mitigating the risk of the LRI
attack in cloud storage services while maintaining the high
bandwidth efficiency of deduplication. By carefully adding
randomized chunk-level redundancy for each uploaded file,
RRCS can mix up the real deduplication states of files used
for the LRI attack, and effectively obfuscate the view of
the attacker, who attempts to exploit the side channel of
network traffic for the LRI attack. Moreover, a flag-based
implementation scheme is introduced to allow the server to
quickly identify the redundant chunks added by RRCS at low
cost. In summary, the main contributions of this paper include:
• Substantially Mitigating the Risk of the LRI Attack.
In RRCS, when a client uploads the non-duplicate chunks
of a file to the server, a small amount of redundant data
chunks are also uploaded, which obfuscate the attacker’s
view on the network traffic. The number of the redundant
chunks is chosen at random. The randomness of redun-
dant chunks in RRCS mixes up the real deduplication
states of files to defend against the LRI attack. Our se-
curity analysis demonstrates that RRCS can significantly
reduce the risk of the LRI attack.
• Ensuring the High Efficiency of Deduplication. RRCS
uploads a small number of redundant chunks to defend
against the LRI attack, which ensures the high efficiency
of deduplication. To further improve the efficiency, we
deduplicate the single-user duplicate files (without secu-
rity risk) in the client and propose a flag-based scheme
to help the server quickly identify the redundant chunks
added by RRCS at a low cost. Our experimental results
based on three large-scale real-world datasets show that
RRCS consumes much less bandwidth overheads than the
RTS.
• Prototype Implementation and Real-world Evalua-
tion. We have really implemented the RRCS prototype in
a deduplication system. We examine the real performance
of RRCS by using multiple real-world datasets, including
Fslhomes [19], MacOS [19], and Onefull [20]. Extensive
experimental results demonstrate the efficiency of RRCS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the background and motivation. The design and im-
plementation of RRCS are described in Section III. We analyze
the security in Section IV and evaluate the performance in
Section V. We conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
A. Learn-the-Remaining-Information Attack in Deduplication
The occurrence of deduplication can be easily identified
by monitoring and analyzing network traffic, which leads
to the risk of user privacy leakage. The attacker can carry
out a very dangerous side channel attack, i.e., learn-the-
remaining-information (LRI) attack, to reveal users’ privacy
information by exploiting the side channel of network traffic
in deduplication.
The LRI Attack: The attacker knows a large part of
the target file in the cloud and tries to learn the remaining
unknown parts of the target file via uploading all possible
versions of the file’s content, i.e,m files. As shown in Figure 1,
the attacker knows all the contents of the target file X except
the sensitive information θ. To learn the sensitive information,
the attacker needs to upload m files (F1, F2, ..., Fm) with all
possible values of θ (θ1, θ2, ..., θm), respectively. If a file Fk
with the value θk is deduplicated and other files are not, the
attacker knows that the information θ = θk.
Note that the attacker knows that, for the m files, only one
file is the same as the file X and the remainingm−1 files are
similar to the fileX since only a small part of their contents are
different from file X . The different parts of their contents are
the sensitive information, such as the PIN [14], the password
of bank account [13], and the salary number, which can usually
be represented as a small number of bits and easily covered
in one-chunk size (about 8kB) in the chunk level.
We use an example to show how the LRI attack is used to
obtain the private information of other users in practice [14].
Alice and Bob belong to the same company. Alice knows
Bob’s employee number and other information about Bob. The
salary of the company is in the range of 5,000 to 15,000, and
a multiple of 1,000. If Alice wants to know Bob’s salary, she
can backup 11 (m = 11) versions of the payroll with Bob’s
name, Bob’s employee number and the salary ranging from
5,000 to 15,000 to the same server in which Bob has backed
up his payroll. Thus Alice can know that Bob has the salary
in the payroll version, in which the deduplication occurs.
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Fig. 1. The LRI attack.
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Fig. 2. The system model.
B. System and Threat Models
We consider a general cloud storage service model that
includes two entities, i.e., the user and cloud storage server.
In the threat model of the side channel attack, the attack is
launched by the users who aim to steal the privacy information
of other users [14], [18], [21]. The attacker can act as an
user via its own account or use multiple accounts to disguise
as multiple users. The cloud storage server communicates
with the users through Internet. The connections from the
clients to the cloud storage server are encrypted by Secure
Socket Layer (SSL) [22] or Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol [23]. Hence, the attacker can monitor and measure the
amount of network traffic between the client and server but
cannot intercept and analyze the contents of the transmitted
data. The attacker can then perform the sophisticated traffic
analysis with sufficient computing resources. As shown in
Figure 2, the user A is the victim who has uploaded his/her
file with privacy information to the cloud storage server. The
user B is the attacker who can upload any number of files
to the same cloud storage server. During the file uploads,
the user B monitors the amount of their network traffic to
determine the duplication states of files and then infers the
privacy information in the file uploaded by the user A, as the
method described in Section II-A.
In summary, this paper mainly focuses on the side channel
of traffic information1, like existing work [14], [18], [21] on
side channel attacks. Thus the attacker could only infer/probe
the privacy by observing the amount of network traffic be-
tween the client and server. The variants of the deduplication
detection method are discussed in details in Section IV-A.
C. The Related Work Addressing the LRI Attack
The security issues of cross-user deduplication in cloud
storage services have been widely studied, including data
confidentiality [15], [17], [24], side channel attacks [14], [18],
and the proofs of ownership [25]. Convergent encryption [17]
is proposed to ensure the data confidentiality in deduplication
systems. However, even with data encryption, deduplication
still leaks the sensitive information of users via the LRI
attack [14], [18]. Existing work addressing the LRI attack can
be divided into two categories.
1Note that if the attacker has the ability to control the SSL encryption
or memory sniffing, etc., a new kind of attack can be formed, whereby the
attacker could potentially obtain the deduplication state of a file. However,
such attack is much harder than the side channel of traffic information, and
is beyond the scope of the threat models we consider.
The first category is based on a special deduplication system
model, i.e., gateway-based system model. The model consists
of three entities, i.e., the user, the gateway provided by the
Network Service Provider, and the storage server. Heen et
al. [18] assume that the gateway is installed in the attacker’s
home network, and propose to use the gateway to mix up the
traffic of the cloud storage service with that of other services.
Shin el al. [21] assume that the gateway is shared by multiple
users, and propose to leverage the gateway to mix up the
traffic among the multiple users. These solutions avoid the
attacker to learn the occurrence of deduplication by monitoring
the network traffic of clients, thus improving the resistance
to the LRI attack. However, an extra gateway provided by
the Network Service Provider is needed, which is not always
possible in practical settings.
The second category addresses the LRI attack in the general
deduplication system model including two entities, i.e., the
user and the storage server. The general system model is
widely used in current cloud storage systems [7]–[9]. Harnik
et al. [14] propose the randomized threshold solution (RTS).
For each file X , the server sets a threshold tX which is chosen
uniformly from the range [2, d] at random (d might be a public
parameter). The server keeps a counter cX to count the number
of previously uploaded copies of file X . When a new copy of
fileX is uploaded, RTS checks the counter cX . If cX is smaller
than tX , the file is uploaded and deduplicated in the server.
Otherwise it is deduplicated in the client. Harnik et al. show
that RTS has a risk of privacy leakage with probability 1
d−1 .
Because tX is chosen uniformly at random, when tX = 2,
the attacker uploads one copy of file X and can learn that
deduplication occurs. Moreover, RTS assigns thresholds to all
files which consumes high bandwidth overhead in the practical
deduplication (detailed in Section V).
D. Motivation
From the identification granularity of the duplicate data, the
deduplication is divided into two categories, i.e., file-level and
chunk-level deduplication. Specifically, file-level deduplication
considers the whole file as a unit to eliminate redundant data.
Chunk-level deduplication divides the entire file into chunks
(fixed-sized [4] or variable-sized [5], [26]), and then considers
the chunk as a unit to eliminate redundant data. Compared with
file-level deduplication, the chunk-level deduplication not only
identifies the identical files, but also eliminates the identical
chunks among the similar files. Consequently, chunk-level
deduplication can obtain higher deduplication ratio, and thus
has been widely used in backup systems [4], [5], [20] and
cloud storage systems [12], [13], [27].
For file-level deduplication, there are two deduplication
states for a file in a given storage system, i.e., duplicate
and non-duplicate. The client does not upload the duplicate-
detected files in the former case. In the latter case, client needs
to upload the non-duplicate files. In the LRI attack, for m
files, only the file Fk with correct sensitive information is the
same as the target file X and thus not uploaded. Other files
Fi(i ∈ [1,m]&i 6= k) with incorrect information are uploaded.
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Fig. 3. The LRI attack in chunk-level deduplication.
If we want to mix up the deduplication states of the file Fk and
other files to defend against the LRI attack, we need to upload
the whole file regardless of whether deduplication occurs, like
RTS [14], which incurs high bandwidth overhead.
This paper focuses on defending against the LRI attack
in chunk-level deduplication. Chunk-level deduplication deals
with duplicate files based on their redundant level. Specifi-
cally, there are three deduplication states for a file: (1) Full
deduplication (Dfull). A client uploads a file Xa to the server.
If an existing file Xb is completely identical to the file Xa,
Xa will be deduplicated without the needs of uploading. (2)
Partial deduplication (Dpart). A file Xc in the server is similar
(partially identical) to file Xa to be uploaded, meaning that
they share some duplicate chunks. The client only uploads
the non-duplicate chunks. (3) No deduplication (Dno). If no
identical/similar files exist in the server, the whole file Xa
needs to be uploaded.
As shown in Figure 3, in the LRI attack, for the m files,
the file Fk with correct sensitive information is completely
identical to the target file X , i.e, Dfull, whose uploading
traffic is zero. Other files have N − 1 duplicate chunks and
one non-duplicate chunk with the value θi (as described in
Section II-A), belonging to Dpart, whose uploading traffics
are equal to one-chunk size. To defend against the LRI attack,
we can explore leveraging chunk-level redundancy rather than
the whole-file redundancy, to mix up the deduplication states
of the file Fk and other files Fi(i ∈ [1,m]&i 6= k) via
uploading some redundant chunks in each file. If the number
of the redundant chunks is set at random, the attacker using
the side channel, i.e., traffic information, would be effectively
prevented from accurately distinguishing the file Fk with
correct sensitive information from the m files used for the
LRI attack.
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we first demonstrate that using deterministic
chunk-level redundancy fails to mitigate the risk of the LRI
attack. We then present the Randomized Redundant Chunk
Scheme (RRCS) which explores and exploits random chunk-
level redundancy to mitigate the risk of the LRI attack.
A. Deterministic Chunk-level Redundancy
As described in Section II-D, for the m files used for the
LRI attack, the uploading traffic of the file Fk with correct
sensitive information is zero and the uploading traffics of the
other m − 1 files are the size of one chunk. To mix up the
m files in terms of the uploading traffic, a simple solution
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Fig. 4. Appending Chunks Attack. (The appended non-duplicate chunk is
marked by yellow in the figure).
is to add a fixed number of redundant chunks to ensure that
the traffic of each file is always more than one-chunk size.
Specifically, for a file with non-duplicate chunks, we upload its
non-duplicate chunks. For a file without non-duplicate chunks,
i.e., the whole file is duplicate, we randomly choose one chunk
of the file to upload. Thus one chunk is uploaded for Fk in
the solution. Hence, the m files are indistinguishable in terms
of uploading traffic, since the traffic of each file is equal to
the size of one chunk.
However, in fact, the solution is easily broken. The attacker
can append one non-duplicate chunk in each file to break
the solution, as shown in Figure 4. The non-duplicate chunk
can be randomly generated. Since the average chunk size is
about 8 KB, a randomly generated chunk is unlikely to exist
in the server since there are 22
16
possible chunks. By doing
so, the traffic of Fk is the size of one chunk and the traffics
of other files are the total size of two chunks. Thus Fk with
correct sensitive information is easily identified from the m
files according to the traffic.
To enhance the simple solution, we can add more redundant
chunks to ensure that the traffic of each file is always more
than the size of l chunks (1 < l < N ), e.g., l = N/2.
However, the attacker can also append more than l non-
duplicate chunks in each file. The traffic of Fk is the size
of one chunk less than the traffics of other files, which breaks
the enhanced solution. We name the method that appends one
or multiple non-duplicate chunks in each file to assist the LRI
attack as Appending Chunks Attack (ACA). In summary, using
deterministic chunk-level redundancy fails to mitigate the risk
of the LRI attack.
B. The Randomized Redundant Chunk Scheme
In this subsection, we present the the randomized redundant
chunk scheme (RRCS). The idea behind RRCS is to explore
and exploit randomized chunk-level redundancy to obfuscate
the view of the attacker, who attempts to measure the upload-
ing traffics of files for executing the LRI attack.
In RRCS, the basic idea of adding redundant chunks is
to choose the number of the redundant chunks from a range
uniformly at random. The redundant chunks can be randomly
chosen from all the duplicate chunks of the file. The redun-
dant chunks can also be generated by padding random/null
characters 2. But the size of each redundant chunk should be
2In current network protocol implementations (e.g., TLS [23] and
SSL [22]), a sequence of null characters will be encrypted into a sequence
of pseudo-random bits. Hence, the chunks padded null characters cannot be
distinguished in the ciphertext.
Range 
Generation
Secure Bounds 
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Security-irrelevant 
Redundancy 
Elimination
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Deduplication 
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Uploaded 
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RRCS Algorithm
Fig. 5. The framework of the randomized redundant chunk (RRC) algorithm.
the chunk size of the file when using fixed-size chunking, and
be the average chunk size of the file when using variable-
size chunking. No matter how the redundant chunks are
generated, they can be easily eliminated by the server using
the implementation scheme described in Section III-C.
1) The Overview of RRCS: RRCS determines the uploaded
chunks based on the real deduplication states of files via mix-
ing the redundant chunks. Figure 5 shows the framework of
RRCS. RRCS includes three key function modules, range gen-
eration (RG), secure bounds setting (SBS), security-irrelevant
redundancy elimination (SRE). When uploading the random-
number redundant chunks, RRCS first uses RG to generate a
fixed range in which the random number is chosen. However,
the fixed range may cause a security issue. SBS is used to
deal with the bounds of the fixed range to avoid the security
issue. There may exist security-irrelevant redundant chunks in
RRCS. SRE reduces the security-irrelevant redundant chunks
to improve the deduplication efficiency. The modules are
detailed as follows.
2) Range Generation: For each file, RRCS first assigns a
range [0, λN ] (λ ∈ (0, 1]), in which the number of redundant
chunks R is chosen uniformly at random. N is the total
number of chunks in a file, which the attacker can obtain
by chunking the file using the chunking algorithm. λ is a
parameter assigned by the deduplication system, which might
be public. How to set the parameter λ for the system is a
tradeoff between the security and bandwidth efficiency, which
we will discuss in Section IV and V. If λN is not an integer,
λN = ⌈λN⌉.
Security Analysis for the Range. As described in Sec-
tion II-A, m files (F1, F2, ..., Fm) are used for executing the
LRI attack, in which the file Fk has the correct sensitive
information. We add Ri(i = 1, 2, ...,m) redundant chunks for
file Fi, and Ri is randomly chosen form the range [0, λN ].
Thus the number of actually uploaded chunks in Fk is in the
range [0, λN ], due to no non-duplicate chunks. The numbers
of actually uploaded chunks in other m − 1 files Fi(i ∈
[1,m]&i 6= k) are in the range 1 + [0, λN ] = [1, λN + 1],
due to one non-duplicate chunk. Hence, the file Fk and other
files have different ranges in terms of the uploading traffic,
which is not secure enough for the LRI attack. There are two
events causing privacy leakage.
• If Rk for the file Fk happens to be 0 with probability
1
λN+1 , the uploading traffic of Fk is zero. Thus the
attacker can easily distinguish Fk from the m files since
the uploading traffic of the other m − 1 files is always
more than zero.
• If Ri(i ∈ [1,m]&i 6= k) for all the m − 1 files with
incorrect sensitive information happen to be λN with
probability 1
λN+1
m−1
, the uploading traffics of all the
m− 1 files are equal to the size of λN +1 chunks. Thus
TABLE I
NOTATION USED IN THE PAPER
Label Description
N The total number of chunks in the file
K The number of non-duplicate chunks after deduplication
R The number of redundant chunks added by RRCS
R′ The number of redundant chunks after eliminating the
security-irrelevant chunks
U The number of actually uploaded chunks (= K +R′)
H The set which R is randomly chosen from
Hfull in Dfull, Hpart in Dpart
the attacker can determine the remaining one file is Fk
since the uploading traffic of Fk is always no more than
the size of λN chunks.
In summary, assigning the same range of the number of the
redundant chunks to the m files results in the risk of privacy
leakage with probability 1
λN+1 +
1
λN+1
m−1
.
3) Secure Bounds Setting: When R happens to the bound
of the fixed range [0, λN ], the attacker can identify the file Fk
with correct sensitive information, resulting in privacy leakage
with a certain probability. In the following, we aim to set the
secure bounds to avoid the privacy leakage.
Form the above discussion, we argue that the problem of
the bounds can be avoided only when the numbers of actually
uploaded chunks in all the m files are in the same range. We
show how to avoid the problem below. Since the server can
clearly know that each uploaded file is completely identical
(Dfull) or partially identical (Dpart) to the files in the server,
different R ranges can be set for different cases. For example,
For the file belonging to Dfull, R is randomly chosen from
[1, λN + 1]. For the file belonging to Dpart, R is randomly
chosen from [0, λN ]. Thus the number of actually uploaded
chunks in Fk which belongs to Dfull is in the range [1, λN+
1]. The numbers of actually uploaded chunks in other m− 1
files which belongs toDpart are also in the range 1+[0, λN ] =
[1, λN + 1].
Overall, we denote that R is randomly chosen from the set
Hfull in the case of Dful, and randomly chosen from the
set Hpart in the case of Dpart. In order to mix up the two
deduplication states in the m files used for the LRI attack, it
is easy to get the equation:
Hpart + 1 = Hfull (1)
Note that the equation means adding 1 to each element in set
Hpart to form the set Hfull.
4) Security-irrelevant Redundancy Elimination: For a file
with N chunks, due to adding the redundant chunks, the
number of uploaded chunks, U , is possibly larger than N .
It is not necessary to upload more than N chunks, since
the U − N redundant chunks become the security-irrelevant
redundant chunks without contributions to the security. We
hence upload N chunks by reducing the number of redundant
chunks, R, when U is larger than N .
Algorithm 1 The Randomized Redundant Chunk Algorithm
Input: The system parameter λ; the toal number of chunks in a file,
N ; and the number of non-duplicate chunks in the file, K;
Output: The chunks which need to be uploaded for the file;
1: λN = ⌈λN⌉;
2: Hpart = [0, λN ];
3: Hfull = Hpart + 1 = [1, λN + 1];
4: if (K == 0) then
5: H = Hfull;
6: else if (0 < K < N) then
7: H = Hpart;
8: else
9: H = {0};
10: end if
11: R is randomly chosen from the set H ;
12: if (R+K > N) then
13: R′ = N −K;
14: else
15: R′ = R;
16: end if
17: Generate R′ redundant chunks by padding random/null characters
or choosing from the duplicate chunks;
5) The RRCS Algorithm: We summarize the RRCS al-
gorithm in Algorithm 1. First, the server assigns the range
[0, λN ] as the set Hpart for a file. RRCS algorithm generates
set Hfull by the Equation 1: Hpart + 1 = Hfull. The two
sets are used for two real deduplication states of files, i.e.,
Dpart and Dfull, respectively. RRCS algorithm then judges
which deduplication state the file belongs to by checking the
number of its non-duplicate chunks K . K = 0 means the file
is completely identical to a file in the server. RRCS algorithm
further configures the set H = Hfull. Moreover, 0 < K < N
means the file will be partially identical (similar) to files in the
server, and we have the set H = Hpart. Otherwise, K = N
means the file has no duplicate chunks in the server, and we
have the set H = {0}. The number of redundant chunks R
is randomly chosen from the set H . If R + K > N , RRCS
algorithm sets R′ = N − K . Otherwise, R′ = R. Finally,
RRCS algorithm generates R′ redundant chunks by padding
random/null characters or choosing from the duplicate chunks.
From the RRCS algorithm, we can see that the number of
the chunks which need to be uploaded U(= K + R′) meets
1 ≤ U ≤ N . For a special case that a file only has one chunk,
i.e., N = 1, the file is directly uploaded in RRCS algorithm.
C. Implementation
In the subsection, we present how to implement RRCS in
the chunk-level deduplication system.
As shown in Figure 6, in chunk-level deduplication, the
real deduplication states of files include full deduplication
(Dfull), partial deduplication (Dpart), and no deduplication
(Dno) (described in Section II-D). Dfull consists of two cases,
i.e., single-user duplicate files and cross-user duplicate files.
The single-user duplicate file means that a file uploaded by a
user is identical to the file previously uploaded by the user,
and thus observing the occurrence of Dfull for the single-user
duplicate file does not cause privacy leakage, as demonstrated
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Fig. 6. Implement RRCS in deduplication.
in [14]. Hence, RRCS directly deduplicates the single-user
duplicate files in the client to obtain the bandwidth savings.
The cross-user duplicate file means that a file uploaded by a
user is identical to the file previously uploaded by other users.
Observing the occurrence of Dfull for the cross-user duplicate
file can be used to reveal other users’ privacy. Hence, RRCS
mixes up the case with Dpart using the RRCS algorithm. We
directly upload the files occurring in Dno.
RRCS is implemented in the client. The server receives both
the non-duplicate chunks and the redundant chunks uploaded
by the client. How to efficiently distinguish the redundant
chunks and the non-duplicate chunks is a challenge.
To address the problem, we present a flag-based implemen-
tation scheme. We modify the deduplication communication
protocol by adding one flag bit in the encrypted data packet.
The flag bit of the redundant chunk is different from that of the
non-duplicate chunk. As shown in Figure 7, the first part of the
data packet in the communication protocol is the fingerprint
of the uploaded chunk. The second part is the content of
data chunk. We add one flag bit (i.e., the red zone) between
fingerprint and data parts. The flag bits of the redundant and
non-duplicate chunks are “1” and “0” respectively. Hence,
when receiving the data packets, the server can identifies the
redundant chunks according to the flag bits.
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Fig. 7. The data flow in the deduplication communication protocol.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first discuss all variants of the dedupli-
cation detection method and analyze whether the variants are
effective in RRCS. We then analyze the security properties of
RRCS for the LRI attack.
A. The Variants of the Deduplication Detection Method
In order to comprehensively evaluate the solutions in re-
sisting the LRI attack, we first elaborate below the baseline
deduplication detection method from the attacker and its
possible variants. As shown in Section II-B, the attacker’s goal
is to exploit/identify the occurrence of deduplication to launch
the LRI attack. To launch the attack, the attacker can pass
the file to the client to upload to the deduplication server.
By measuring the uploading traffic, i.e., the side channel,
the attacker could attempt to infer/probe the occurrence of
deduplication. There are several variants of the above detection
method, but we show below that those variants can all be
reduced to the above baseline detection method. Thus, later
in the next subsection we will only focus on the defense of
above baseline case.
The variants include: 1) The attacker might upload the same
file multiple times. However, only the first upload could be
deemed useful for the attacker. This is because the file will
be stored in the server after its first uploaded (regardless of
whether there was an old copy of the file or not in the server),
and thus all the subsequent upload of the same file will be
always identical to the attacker’s own file. Such reasonings
could be extended to the case where the attacker might use
multiple accounts to disguise as multiple users to upload the
same file. 2) The attacker can also try to upload a file to
the server and then immediately delete the file. By repeating
the operations of uploading and deleting the file, in theory the
attacker can perform multiple uploadings. However, this is not
feasible in practice. As pointed out by Harnik et al. [14], many
online storage services, such as DropBox, Memopal and Mozy,
need to keep copies of the deleted files for a period of at least
30 days, either for the purpose of storage resilience or version
recovery. Users hence can restore to past versions. Therefore,
the execution of each iteration of the attack has to last at least
30 days. The need of long term execution and the fact that the
target file status in cloud could be easily changed during the
long period due to normal application requests would render
such attack practically useless to the attacker. Again, only the
first uploaded file is useful for the attacker in RRCS.
B. Security Strength of RRCS
We analyze the security of RRCS for the LRI attack in
the general case. We then analyze the security of RRCS for
the LRI attack assisted by the Appending Chunks Attack
(presented in Section III-A).
1) The LRI Attack in the General Case: For the LRI attack,
the attacker knows a big part of the targeted file X and
tries to determine the remaining unknown parts of file X
via uploading all possible versions of the file’s content. All
possible versions are m files in which only one file is the
same as file X and the remaining m − 1 files are similar to
file X since only a small part of their contents are different
from file X , as the background described in Section II-A. The
sizes of different contents are smaller than that of one data
chunk. The attacker could observe the client’s upload of m
similar files Fi (i = 1, 2, ...,m) via chunk-level deduplication
and measure the uploading traffic.
In general, by observing the results of measuring the up-
loading traffic, the attacker can find that the uploading traffic
of one file Fk is zero, and the uploading traffics of other files
are equal to the size of one chunk. The attacker hence confirms
the content of the file Fk is the same as the target file X .
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Fig. 8. RRCS under the Appending Chunks Attack. (The appended non-
duplicate chunk is marked by yellow in the figure).
In order to prove that RRCS can address the LRI attack in
the general case, we demonstrate in Theorem 1 that m files
should be indistinguishable in RRCS.
Theorem 1: In the general case, the m files used for the LRI
attack are indistinguishable from the attacker’s view in RRCS.
Proof 1: Initially, the target file X exists in the server. m
files (F1, F2, ..., Fm) are uploaded for the LRI attack, in which
file Fk is the same as file X . Due to adding randomized
redundant chunks in RRCS, the uploading traffic of file Fk
is equal to the size of Rk chunks. The uploading traffics of
the other m − 1 files Fi (i ∈ [1,m], i 6= k) are equal to
the size of 1 + Ri (i ∈ [1,m], i 6= k) chunks. Since Fk
belongs to Dfull and the other m − 1 files belong to Dpart,
we have that Rk is randomly chosen from the set Hfull, and
Ri (i ∈ [1,m], i 6= k) are randomly chosen from Hpart, as
shown in Section III-B3. We thus obtain Rk ∈ Hfull and
1 + Ri ∈ 1 + Hpart
3 (i ∈ [1,m], i 6= k). According to
Equation 1, we have Hfull = 1+Hpart. Hence, the identical
file Fk and other m − 1 similar files have the same range of
uploading traffic, from the attacker’s view. Hence, the attacker
cannot distinguish between the identical file Fk and the other
m− 1 files Fi (i ∈ [1,m], i 6= k).
In summary, RRCS defends against the LRI attack by
making the m files used for executing the LRI attack indistin-
guishable from the attacker’s view in the general case.
2) The LRI Attack Assisted by Appending Chunks Attack
(ACA): To execute the ACA, the attacker can append one or
multiple non-duplicate chunks to each file in the m files used
for the LRI attack. In the following, we analyze the security
of RRCS for the LRI attack assisted by the ACA.
Initially, the target file X exists in the server. m files
(F1, F2, ..., Fm) are uploaded for the LRI attack, in which
each file has N chunks and the file Fk is the same as file X .
By executing the ACA, L(L ≥ 1) non-duplicate chunks are
appended to each file. We denote the m files appended non-
duplicate chunks as F ′1, F
′
2, ..., F
′
m, which have N+L chunks.
Due to being appended by non-duplicate chunks, all them new
files belong to Dpart, in which Ri(i ∈ [1,m]) are randomly
chosen from the range [1, λN + 1] in RRCS. Thus the range
of the number of actually uploaded chunks in the file F ′k is
0+L+[1, λN+1] = [L+1, λN+L+1], and the ranges in the
otherm−1 files are 1+L+[1, λN+1] = [L+2, λN+L+2],
31 +Hpart means adding 1 to each element in set Hpart.
as shown in Figure 8. The file F ′k and other m− 1 files have
different ranges in terms of the uploading traffic.
To analyze security, we demonstrate in Theorem 2 that
RRCS leaks no information with high probability for ACA.
Theorem 2: For the LRI attack assisted by the Appending
Chunks Attack, RRCS leaks no information which prevents the
attacker from accurately identifying the file with the correct
sensitive information from the m files, with the probability of
1− 1
λ(N+L)+1 −
1
λ(N+L)+1
m−1
.
Proof 2: We consider all four events in RRCS where the
attacker wants to identify F ′k with correct sensitive information
from the m files appended by non-duplicate chunks.
1) The attacker uploads the m files. If observing the up-
loading traffic of one file is equal to the size of L + 1
chunks, the attacker can determine that the file is F ′k,
since L + 1 only belongs to the range of the number of
actually uploaded chunks in F ′k .
2) If the traffics of m − 1 files are equal to the size of
λ(N + L) + L + 2 chunks 4, the attacker can determine
that the remaining one file is F ′k, since λ(N +L) +L+
2 only belongs to the ranges of the number of actually
uploaded chunks in them−1 files with incorrect sensitive
information.
3) If the traffics of all m files are between the sizes of
L+2 and λ(N +L)+L+1 chunks, the attacker fails to
determine which file is F ′k . This is because the traffics of
allm files can cover the range of [L+2, λ(N+L)+L+1]
chunks size. The m files are indistinguishable from the
attacker’s view in RRCS, based on the proof in Sec-
tion IV-B1.
4) If the traffics of n files are the size of λ(N +L)+L+2
chunks and the traffics of the remaining m− n files are
between the sizes of L+2 chunks and λ(N +L)+L+1
chunks, the attacker can determine that F ′k is not in the
n files but still cannot identify F ′k from the remaining
m− n files. Thus the m− n files containing Fk are in-
distinguishable from the attacker’s view in RRCS, based
on the proof in Section IV-B1.
The first event that leaks information, occurs with probabil-
ity 1
λ(N+L)+1 .
5 The second event leaking information occurs
with probability 1
λ(N+L)+1
m−1
. Whereas the third and fourth
events, which do not leak information, occur with probability
1− 1
λ(N+L)+1 −
1
λ(N+L)+1
m−1
.
Remark. How to set λ for the server is a tradeoff between
the security and bandwidth efficiency. The larger λ is, the
higher the probability of leaking no information is. But larger
λ also leads to larger range of R, which would naturally result
in more potential bandwidth overhead. Nevertheless, even
when λ = 1, RRCS provides the best security guarantee while
4If λ(N + L) is not an integer, λ(N + L) = ⌈λ(N + L)⌉.
5Note that since the average size of personal files is over 600kB in the real-
world datasets as shown in Table II and thus the average number of chunks
N is large enough (N > 600kB/10kB = 60), the probability of leaking
information 1
λ(N+L)+1
is very small.
can also obtain good bandwidth efficiency as demonstrated in
SectionV-D.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Setup and Datasets
To evaluate the performance of RRCS, we implement a
prototype of cross-user source-based deduplication system
with RRCS. The client is equipped with the Ubuntu 12.04
operating system running on a quad-core Intel Core i5-4460
CPU at 3.20 GHz, with a 16GB RAM and a 2TB hard disk.
The server has a 16-core CPU, a 32GB RAM and a 10TB
hard disk. The RRCS prototype is written in C language in a
Linux environment.
We examine the performance of RRCS using three real-
world trace-based datasets, i.e., Fslhomes [19], MacOS [19],
and Onefull [20]. We explore the characteristics of the datasets
in Section V-B and summarize them in Table II.
• Fslhomes was collected in the File system and Storage
Lab (FSL) at Stony Brook University, which contains the
snapshots of students’ home directories from a shared
network file system. The files contain virtual machine
images, office documents, source code, binaries and other
miscellaneous files.
• MacOS was collected from a MacOS X Enterprise Server
that holds 247 users and provides multiple services:
email, webservers, calendar server, mailman for mailing
lists, wiki server, mySQL, and a trouble-ticketing server.
• Onefull is a subset of the trace reported by Xia et al. [20],
which was collected from the personal computers of 15
graduate students in our research group.
As described in Section III-C, single-user duplicate files do
not cause privacy leakage. We eliminate single-user duplicate
files in the source (client), which obtains significant bandwidth
savings in RRCS and RTS. RRCS and RTS hence exhibit the
same bandwidth efficiency, i.e., no bandwidth overheads, in
eliminating the single-user redundancy. On the other hand,
for cross-user deduplication, RRCS and RTS add different-
granularity redundancies (i.e., chunk and file) for defend-
ing against the side channel attacks. Therefore, we examine
the performance of eliminating the cross-user redundancy in
RRCS and RTS. In the performance evaluation, we elimi-
nate single-user duplicate files in the client and evaluate the
bandwidth efficiency of cross-user deduplication as shown in
Section V-D.
B. The Characteristics of the Datasets
Before evaluating the performance of RRCS, we explore
and analyze the characteristics of cross-user file redundancy
in the three real-world datasets owning many users. We count
the number of the files that have k copies (k = 1, 2, 3, ...),
while k is the number of users sharing the file.
The relationships between the number of files and their
copies are shown in Figure 9. The number of files exponen-
tially decreases as a function of the number of file copies.
We can observe that most files only have a few copies (i.e.,
shared by a few users). We summarize the results in Table II
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Fig. 9. The characteristics of datasets. (The blue lines show the percentage of the number of files having k copies in the total number of files.)
TABLE II
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF DATASETS
Fslhome MacOS Onefull
Total size 5.1TB 1.9TB 219GB
Avg. chunk size 8kB 8kB 10kB
Avg. file size 1530kB 683kB 622kB
Cross-user redundancy ratio 39% 48% 25%
The total number of files 3.663M 3.058M 378K
The number of unique files 2.238M 1.600M 283K
The number of 0.316M 0.281M 7.8K
> 3 copies unique files (8.4%) (7.4%) (2.8%)
The number of 0.068M 0.011M 2.0K
> 5 copies unique files (4.8%) (0.7%) (0.7%)
The number of 0.017M 0.003M 0
> 10 copies unique files (0.9%) (0.2%) (0)
(M is 106, and K is 103 in the Table). For Fslhomes dataset,
the number of unique files containing more than 5 copies only
accounts for 4.8% of the total number of the unique files. For
MacOS dataset, the number of unique files containing more
than 5 copies only accounts for 0.7% of the total number of
unique files. We also investigate the redundancy characteristics
in chunk-level which show the similar results.
As a result, most files only have a few copies (or shared
by a few users) in the real-world datasets. RTS [14] performs
target-based deduplication when the number of file copies is
small than a pre-defined threshold (detailed in Section II-C).
However, since the files having a few copies account for a
significant proportion as shown in Figure 9, most files are
performed target-based deduplication in RTS. Therefore, RTS
becomes bandwidth-inefficient in the real-world datasets.
C. Uploading a Single File Multiple Times
We mainly consider five deduplication schemes, including
source-based deduplication, target-based deduplication, file-
level RTS, chunk-level RTS, and RRCS. Based on the file-level
RTS described in Section II-C, we develop the chunk-level
RTS for comparisons, in which a random threshold T is set
for each chunk. The five deduplication schemes have the same
space savings in the storage server, but different bandwidth
savings (i.e., the reduced amount of the transmitted data by
the above five deduplication schemes).
In order to intuitively compare the characteristic of the
five deduplication schemes in bandwidth overheads, we first
consider a simple situation that the same file is uploaded
multiple times by different users. We use an 800kB-size file,
which is divided into 100 chunks with the average chunk size
of 8kB. We upload the file k times and observe the changes
of the total amount of the transmitted data among the above
mentioned four schemes. Specifically, file-level (chunk-level)
RTS uses the target-based deduplication when the number of
the uploaded copies of the file (chunk) is smaller than the
threshold T that is chosen uniformly from the range [2, d].
We use the parameter setting in their paper [14], i.e., d = 20.
RRCS needs to upload the randomized redundant chunks for
defending against the LRI attack.
Figure 10 shows the changes of the total amount of the
transmitted data (i.e., the total traffic) with the increase of the
file upload number k. For the target-based deduplication, the
total traffic of uploading file k times is equal to k times the
size of the file. For file-level RTS, the total traffic is equal
to k times the size of the file when k is smaller than the
threshold T , and the file is deduplicated in the client when k
is larger than T . T = 11 in the Figure 10, which is selected
by the average value in the range [2, 20]. Other cases that
the T is set to other numbers are easy to understand. For
chunk-level RTS, the total traffic increases slower than that
of file-level RTS. When the number of file uploads is high
(i.e., 17), file-level and chunk-level RTS have the near-same
total traffic, since setting a threshold to a file has the same
expectation of the total traffic as setting a threshold to each
chunk in the file. For RRCS, the total traffic grows slowly
due to adding chunk-level redundancy, and the curve shows
a fluctuation since the number of redundant chunks is at
random. Compared with RTS, when the file uploading times
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k is quite large (more than 42 in Figure 10), the total traffic
in RRCS may be more than RTS. However, we argue that the
files containing many copies are very few in the real-world
datasets as shown in Section V-B. Thus the RRCS could obtain
significant improvements in terms of the bandwidth saving,
compared with the RTS.
D. Bandwidth Overhead
We compare these deduplication schemes in terms of band-
width overheads in cross-user deduplication, using the three
real-world datasets mentioned above. Specifically, in file-level
(chunk-level) RTS, we also use the range [2, 20] in which the
threshold of each file (chunk) is uniformly chosen at random,
as the parameter setting in their paper [14]. In RRCS, we
respectively set the system parameter λ = 0.5 and λ = 1 to
show how the different λ impacts the bandwidth efficiency.
Figure 11 shows the normalized bandwidth overheads of five
schemes. The bandwidth overhead of target-based deduplica-
tion is equal to the total file size. Compared with target-based
deduplication, source-based deduplication reduces 25%−48%
bandwidth overheads in the three datasets, due to eliminating
all redundancy in the client. File-level (chunk-level) RTS
reduce 3.2%−6.6% (4.6%−7.9%) bandwidth overheads, due
to only obtaining the bandwidth saving of the files (chunks)
that have many copies. In fact, these files (chunks) having
many copies are quite few as discussed in Section V-B. RRCS
with λ = 0.5 reduces 20.0% − 32.3% bandwidth overheads
and RRCS with λ = 1 reduces 13.4% − 23.0% bandwidth
overheads. We observe that with the increase of λ, the band-
width overhead of RRCS increases, since larger λ provides
better security guarantee while consuming more bandwidth
overhead, as discussed in Section IV-B2. Even though in the
worst case where λ = 1 in terms of bandwidth overhead,
RRCS still consumes much less bandwidth overheads than
RTS.
Figure 12 shows the redundancy elimination ratios of the
five schemes. Source-based deduplication eliminates 100%
data redundancy which however has no security guarantee.
File-level (chunk-level) RTS only eliminate 8.1% − 16.8%
(9.8% − 20.3%) redundancy, due to only eliminating the
redundancy of the files (chunks) that have many copies. RRCS
with λ = 0.5 eliminates 76.1%−78.0% redundancy and RRCS
with λ = 1 eliminates 47.9%− 53.6% redundancy. Compared
with RTS, RRCS can eliminate 2 to 10 times data redundancy.
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Fig. 12. Redundancy elimination (RE) ratio.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a simple yet effective scheme called
RRCS to address an important security issue which dedu-
plication can be exploited to carry out the LRI attack to
steal user privacy in cloud storage services. RRCS mixes up
the real deduplication states of files used for the LRI attack
by adding the randomized redundant chunks, which prevents
the attacker from accurately identifying the file with correct
sensitive information and thus significantly mitigates the risk
of the LRI attack. RRCS also allows the system to control the
tradeoff/balance between the security and bandwidth efficiency
by a configurable parameter λ. A larger λ results in higher
security but lower deduplication efficiency. When λ = 1,
RRCS provides the best security guarantee while also obtains
a relatively high redundancy elimination ratio, i.e., about 50%.
Based on the real RRCS prototype, experimental results from
using three real-world datasets demonstrate that RRCS has
much less bandwidth overheads than the RTS.
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